Is consciousness required for high level cognitive processes, or can the unconscious mind perform tasks that are as complex and difficult as, for example, understanding a sentence? Recent work has argued that, yes, the unconscious mind can: Sklar et al. (2012) found that sentences, masked from consciousness using the technique of continuous flash suppression (CFS), broke into awareness more rapidly when their meanings were more unusual or more emotionally negative, even though processing the sentences' meaning required unconsciously combining each word's meaning. This has motivated the important claim that consciousness plays little-to-no functional role in high-level cognitive operations. Here, we aimed to replicate and extend these findings, but instead, across 10 high-powered studies, we found no evidence that the meaning of a phrase or word could be understood without awareness. We did, however, consistently find evidence that low-level perceptual features, such as sentence length and familiarity of alphabet, could be processed unconsciously. Our null findings for sentence processing are corroborated by a meta-analysis that aggregates our studies with the prior literature. We offer a potential explanation for prior positive results through a set of computational simulations, which show how the distributional characteristics of this type of CFS data, in particular its skew and heavy tail, can cause an elevated level of false positive results when common data exclusion criteria are applied. Our findings thus have practical implication for analyzing such data. More importantly, they suggest that consciousness may well be required for high-level cognitive tasks such as understanding language.
Language and awareness are inextricably linked. We can only talk about things we are aware of, and it would seem paradoxical to say that we can understand a sentence without being aware of what it means. But the precise role played by awareness in understanding language is unclear. While there has been a long history of investigating whether consciousness is critical for extracting the shape, sound or meanings of individual words (for review see Kouider & Dehaene, 2007) , that work has only rarely examined whether or how consciousness influences the processes by which word meanings are combined into phrases (Draine, 1997; Marcel, 1980) . Indeed, many prominent theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory (Baars, 1997 (Baars, , 2005 Dehaene & Naccache, 2001 ), have implicitly assumed that combinatorial sentence processing demands awareness, because it relies heavily on two things which have been proposed to be diminished without awareness: the use of complex working memory operations (e.g., to bind together the meanings of distant words, Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) and access to world knowledge (e.g., to interpret the meanings of vague or ambiguous words, Hobbs, Stickel, Martin, & Edwards, 1993) .
Against the background of this conservative interpretation, a prominent recent body of work has argued that consciousness is not, in fact, required for high level cognitive operations such as understanding sentences. According to the so-called "Yes It Can" principle (Hassin, 2013) , "unconscious processes [are able to] perform the same fundamental, high-level functions that conscious processes can perform" (p. 195) , as evidenced by experiments that use a technique called continuous flash suppression. Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a form of binocular rivalry, in which a monocularly presented target stimulus is masked from awareness by presenting a dynamic high-contrast mask to the other eye (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) , an effect that can last from a few hundred milliseconds to tens of seconds. The time it takes a stimulus to "break through" suppression is known to depend on unconscious processing of lower-level visual properties (e.g., larger or noisier stimuli break through suppression faster (Carmel, Arcaro, Kastner, & Hasson, 2010; Gray, Adams, Hedger, Newton, & Garner, 2013; Sterzer, Stein, Ludwig, Rothkirch, & Hesselmann, 2014; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Yang & Blake, 2012) . Moreover, this technique of "breaking CFS" (b-CFS)-explicitly measuring time to breakthrough-has provided some evidence that high level properties may also be processed without awareness (cf. , for instance, negative facial expressions break through faster than neutral ones (e.g., Yang, Zald, & Blake, 2007) . However, the high-level features in such work have not been symbolic in nature.
Excitingly, Sklar and colleagues found that the time taken for a masked sentence to "break" through suppression was also affected by a property that is both high level and symbolic: its meaning (Sklar et al., 2012) . Masked sentences with unusual meanings (I ironed the coffee) were faster to break through suppression than control sentences (I drank coffee), while phrases that had negative emotional valence (e.g., electric chair) broke through suppression faster than neutral phrases (dining table), even though each word in the negative phrase was itself unvalenced (requiring combinatorial processing of word sequences for valence to be parsed).
These results-alongside the same article's additional demonstrations that certain arithmetic operations can be carried out without awareness-provide an important challenge to current theories of how awareness and high-level cognition interrelate. For instance, they suggest that awareness might play a much more limited role in high-level processing than previously assumed, or that our assumptions about language processing are incorrect, and that working memory and world knowledge are not required to understand sentences.
However, before making such large changes to theories of consciousness or language, it is important to be confident that these results are replicable, that they generalize across a variety of environmental conditions and situations, and that they cannot be accounted for by simpler explanations. For example, one concern about experiments of this type is the difficulty of fully disentangling a sentence's high level properties (e.g., its meaning) from its low level properties (e.g., its shape and form, cf., Farmer, Christiansen, & Monaghan, 2006) . While Sklar et al. (2012) made efforts to rule out lower level explanations of their results, doing so is difficult because sentences with different meanings necessarily have different forms.
A second concern, perhaps more important, is that Sklar et al.'s (2012) results run counter to other findings about semantic access to word meanings during continuous flash suppression. For example, they contrast with an older literature on binocular rivalry which had concluded that high-level conceptual or semantic processing was diminished for suppressed stimuli (Zimba & Blake, 1983) . More recently, using CFS, Kang, Blake, and Woodman (2011) found no evidence that the meanings of individual words were accessed when they were suppressed (although see Heyman & Moors, 2012 , for a critique of that procedure), while Yang and Yeh (2011) found that emotionally negative Chinese words were in fact slower to break suppression than neutral words, a finding in the opposite direction to the effect found by Sklar et al. (2012) . 1 Recent work on statistical inference and measurement has emphasized that such inconsistent results might be expected when experiments with low statistical power are used to test for small or null effects (Gelman & Carlin, 2014) , and these worries are particularly marked in this instance given concerns that data from the b-CFS method are potentially very noisy (e.g., breaking times often have a very long right tail, Moors, Stein, Wagemans, & van Ee, 2015; Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011) .
A final concern relates to data analysis strategies. Shanks (2016) has argued that many reported findings from the field of unconscious cognition are likely to be false positives, caused by common practices for excluding data or participants. As one example, participants in these studies are often excluded if they pass an awareness test (demonstrating that suppression from awareness had failed). But if the awareness test is a noisy measure, and if performance on the awareness test is correlated with performance on the critical task, then regression to the mean implies that those participants who receive extremely high scores on the awareness test will likely have less extreme scores on the critical task and, importantly, vice versa, that is, seemingly "unaware" participants should likely have more extreme scores on the critical task. Indeed, Shanks (2016) showed that Sklar et al.'s (2012) demonstration of unconscious arithmetic processing might be explainable this way. While Sklar et al. (2012) found priming effects for participants who did not show awareness during their task, a reanalysis showed that priming effects were in fact smaller for participants who did show awareness, consistent with regression to the mean. Building on this, Moors and Hesselmann (2017) provide additional reanalyses of that dataset which suggest the evidence for unconscious arithmetic is only equivocal.
Given the potential theoretical importance of Sklar et al.'s (2012) results, but also these concerns about the replicability of their findings, we decided to conduct a series of highly powered partial replications and extensions of their experiments. Our replications were high powered in that we used a considerably larger number of participants and stimuli than in prior work, but we label them as "partial" because the original experiments were conducted in Hebrew, whereas ours were conducted in English. In Studies 1 and 2 we test whether anomalous phrases (I ironed the coffee) break suppression faster than control phrases (I ironed the clothes), using English translations of the original sentences as well as novel sentences that better control for low-level visual properties. In Studies 3 and 4 we test whether emotionally valenced phrases (electric chair) break suppression faster, again using both translated stimuli and novel stimuli designed to control for low-level factors. Study 5 tests whether low level visual properties of the original Hebrew might offer an alternative explanation of the original findings. Studies 6 through 9 replicate Studies 1 through 4, but using the same stimulus presentation scripts used in Sklar et al. (2012) . Finally, Study 10 is an English language test of Yang and Yeh's (2011) finding that emotionally negative single words break suppression more slowly than neutral words.
To preview, across our experiments we find no evidence that participants process the combinatorial semantics of suppressed sentences, or even the semantics of a single suppressed word. We do find that the time taken for a sentence to break suppression is influenced by certain visual factors, such as the physical length of the sentence, the luminance contrast between the sentence and its background, and the participant's familiarity with the writing system (English/Hebrew, see Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007 ), but we find no evidence of unconscious combinatorial semantic processing. We offer an explanation for this failure to replicate through a set of statistical simulations, which show that the type of data produced in experiments using the breaking continuous flash suppression method, with high variability and a heavy right tail, generate an increased rate of false positives when combined with data exclusion practices that are commonly used in psychology.
As we lay out in the General Discussion, these results thus have implications for both theory and practice. They provide evidence against the hypothesis that language processing occurs without awareness, and they motivate an approach to statistical analysis that pays more attention to the distributional form of the data. Sklar et al.'s (2012) Experiment 1 found that anomalous sentences (I ironed the coffee) broke suppression faster than neutral sentences (I ironed the clothes). In our Study 1, we attempted a higher-powered English language replication of this finding, using 53 participants rather than the original 32. Study 2 was an extension of that experiment: We tested whether effects of unconscious semantic processing might be found when we better-controlled for lower-level visual and lexical properties of the stimuli. In particular, we contrasted neutral sentences (Mike ate the steak) with reversed sentences that were anomalous (the steak ate Mike), that is, we held the words constant while drastically changing the sentence's meaning.
Studies 1 and 2
Although we report Studies 1 and 2 separately, the data were collected in the same testing session. Because the parameters of the two studies were identical, their trials were randomly intermingled.
Study 1 Method
Participants. Fifty-three members of the University of Edinburgh community (39 female, mean age 21 years, range 18 -41) participated in the study, and were paid £8 an hour. All identified English as their native language from birth and had normal or corrected vision with no color blindness. This number of participants, combined with the 105 items used (with different items used between conditions), gave us 80% statistical power to detect an effect of size 0.39 or larger based on the procedure described in Westfall, Kenny, and Judd (2014) . When we conducted this experiment we were not able to calculate an effect size from the original experimental report, as we did not know the correlation between participants' response times in the two conditions. While writing this article we received the original data, and calculated the original effect size to be only 0.11. Westfall et al.'s (2014) procedure indicates that it is not possible to achieve 80% power to detect such a small effect using this experimental design, even with an infinite number of participants.
Apparatus. Stimuli were presented on a 19 inch CRT monitor in a dimly lit room, connected to a computer running PsychoPy2 software (Peirce, 2007) . A chin rest and mirror stereoscope were positioned 57 cm from the monitor, with a vertical divider splitting the display so that each eye only saw half of the screen.
Procedure. Each trial (see Figure 1 ) began with a fixation cross, presented binocularly at the center of each eye's visual field between two textured vergence bars, allowing participants to reach stable binocular vergence. After 2,000 ms, the fixation cross remained superimposed on both screens, but a changing Mondrian mask was presented to one eye; 200 ms later a sentence was presented to the other eye, positioned slightly above or below the fixation cross, and continuously ramping up in contrast from 0% to 50% over 700 ms. The visual mask consisted of a field of squares which randomly changed in size, color, contrast, rotation, and position at a rate of 60 Hz (we had intended to use Sklar et al.'s (2012) original presentation rate of 10 Hz, but a technical error caused the changes to occur at the screen's refresh rate; Studies 6 through 10, which used a 10 Hz rate, show that this error does not explain the divergence between our findings and those of Sklar et al., 2012) .
Sentences were presented in random order; sentence position (above or below fixation) and the eye it was presented to varied randomly between trials. Participants were instructed to focus on the fixation cross with both eyes open, without blinking or looking around, and to quickly press the "up" arrow key if they detected text above the cross, or the "down" arrow key for text below the cross. If the participant did not respond within 8 s, the trial timed out. This time-out was not included in Sklar et al.'s (2012) original method, but we did not think it was likely to greatly affect our results, as average by-condition response times in their experiments were less than 1 s. As such, response times as long as 8 s would be considered outliers.
After participants made their detection report, they also reported their subjective experience of the trial. Using a modified version of the perceptual awareness scale (Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010) , participants rated the clarity with which they had experienced the lexical stimulus, choosing from the levels no text, blurry text, almost clear text, and absolutely clear text (which were assigned numerical values of 0 to 3, respectively, in our analysis).
Before beginning the experiment, participants completed five training trials to ensure that the stereoscope was properly calibrated and that they understood the task. Participants were given the opportunity to pause after every 75 trials.
All of the studies reported here were approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee of the University of Edinburgh.
Materials. Stimuli were English translations of the Hebrew expressions used in Sklar et al.'s (2012) Experiment 1, provided in the appendix to that article. These consisted of 34 critical violation sentences, in which an animate actor performed an implausible action on an object (e.g., I ironed the coffee); 68 control sentences, in which the action or object from the violation condition was used in a sensible way (e.g., I made the coffee, I ironed the clothes); and 34 semantically felicitous filler sentences (e.g., I washed the cup). Each stimulus was presented once. A full list of stimuli is presented in the supplemental materials.
Analyses. We first removed all trials that timed out (median ϭ 0 trials per participant [range ϭ 0 -44]). We then followed the complex set of criteria that Sklar et al. (2012) used for excluding participants and trials from analysis. First, participants were excluded if their sentence localization accuracy was below 90%. Second, participants were excluded if their mean response time was greater than 3 standard deviations away from the grand mean of all participants. Third, trials were excluded if they were answered incorrectly or timed out. Fourth, trials were excluded for each participant if their response time was greater than 3 standard deviations away from the participant's grand mean. Fifth, trials were excluded for each condition if their response time was greater than 3 standard deviations from the condition's grand mean (across participants). Finally, trials were excluded as anticipatory if their response time was less than 200 ms. In total, five participants were excluded along with 6% of the remaining trials (median ϭ 5 trials per participant [range ϭ 1-20]). With these exclusions, we still had 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.4. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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We then analyzed the resulting data in three different ways. First, we replicated the original analysis by Sklar et al. (2012) , comparing mean raw response times to the different sentence types (violation/control) using paired t tests.
Second, because visual inspection of the response times prior to exclusions suggested that they had severe positive skew (estimated at 2.5 using the method of moments), we carried out the same analysis on log transformed response times, which reduced skew to 0.9 (for this analysis we reran the exclusion criteria on the logtransformed data).
Finally, we conducted a mixed effects regression analysis on the log transformed data. Mixed effects analyses (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Gelman & Hill, 2007) are an extension of standard regression analyses, that are designed for modeling data sets that can be decomposed into different subgroups, such that regression coefficients might vary to account for these different subgroups; the resulting coefficient estimates in the regression are thus a mixture of fixed effects, that apply generally across the dataset, and random effects that modulate the fixed effects within each subgroup. For example, in the present dataset, a mixed effects regression analysis can be used to model variation in the dataset such as whether each participant's response times have a consistent bias away from the mean, whether each different item's response times have a consistent bias away from the mean, and whether the effect of sentence type (i.e., the difference in response speed for violation and control sentences) varies from participant to participant. By contrast, more traditional analyses are unable to simultaneously account for variation across multiple subgroups (like participants and items).
As well as being able to model important variance within data sets, an important advantage of mixed effects models is that they can account for experimental designs that contain unbalanced data, a property that is particularly important here (and in Sklar et al., 2012) because the design used twice as many control sentences as violation sentences. In addition, because mixed effects regressions are an extension of multiple regression, they allow us to simultaneously assess the effect of sentence type while accounting for control variables, such as sentence length (longer sentences may break suppression faster because they are composed of more pixels, and the overall probability of a stimulus breaking suppression is a weighted sum of the probability of each pixel breaking suppression).
In the remainder of this article, we describe the structure of our mixed effects regression using the syntax designed for lme4 regressions (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in the statistical analysis software package R. For Study 1 our regression had the structure response time (RT) ϳ 1 ϩ Sentence Type ϩ Sentence Length ϩ (1 ϩ Sentence Type|Participant) ϩ (1|Item), where the dependent variable (response time [RT] ) precedes the tilde, fixed effects immediately follow the tilde, and random effects are placed in brackets. Our model of response times was thus composed of a fixed effect intercept term, fixed effects of sentence type (violation/control sentences) and of sentence length (in number of characters), random by-participant adjustments to the intercept and This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
the effect of sentence type, and random by-item adjustments to the intercept. In plain English, this means that we tested whether there was a significant effect of sentence type on response times, while accounting for how response times vary by sentence length, for how response times vary across different items, for how response times vary across different participants, and for how the effect of sentence type might vary across those participants. In this analysis, and all other mixed effects analyses, all predictor variables were centered (factorial predictors used contrast coding) and continuous predictor variables (e.g., sentence length) were standardized by one standard deviation. We calculated p values for predictors in the mixed effects models by approximating the t distribution with the z distribution. Finally, we also analyzed whether participants gave different ratings on the Perceptual Awareness Scale depending on the experimental condition.
Results
When the raw response time data were analyzed using a paired t test, we found a marginal effect of sentence type, t(47) ϭ 1.79, p ϭ .08. However, as can be seen in Figure 2 , this effect was in the opposite direction to that found by Sklar et al. (2012) : In the original study, violation sentences were faster to break suppression than controls, but we found that violation sentences were marginally slower to break suppression (M control ϭ 1,466 ms, SD ϭ 505; M violation ϭ 1,501 ms, SD ϭ 566).
However, when we analyzed log-transformed response times we no longer found even a marginal effect of sentence type, t(47) ϭ 1.2, p ϭ .22, which perhaps suggests that the marginal result was not indicative of a true effect of semantics on suppression times (M control ϭ 7.21 log ms, SD ϭ 0.36; M violation ϭ 7.23 log ms, SD ϭ 0.38). Consistent with this, when response times were analyzed with a mixed effects model, accounting for sentence length, there was again no reliable effect of sentence type, unstandardized B ϭ 0.01(0.01), t ϭ 1.02, p ϭ .31.
Interestingly, when we analyzed the Perceptual Awareness Scale ratings, we found that control sentences were reported as having been seen slightly (but significantly) more clearly than violation sentences (M control ϭ 1.86, SD ϭ 0.49; M violation ϭ 1.81, SD ϭ 0.50), t(47) ϭ 2.8, p ϭ .007). This could imply that participants used a different detection criterion for concluding that violation sentences had been perceived clearly (for instance, violation sentences may have required more evidence to recognize because of their unusual meanings). This criterion difference could potentially explain the RT finding, that control sentences were perceived more quickly, because participants would have been more willing to conclude that they were there. However, this result could also imply that control sentences emerged more vividly into awareness than violation sentences, which might implicate unconscious semantic processing. Because of its ambiguity, we do not interpret this result further for now; importantly, our subsequent studies test whether it would replicate for conceptually similar conditions.
Discussion
Unlike in Sklar et al. (2012) , the semantically anomalous sentences in Study 1 did not break suppression faster than neutral sentences. Although there was a marginal effect of semantics (in the opposite direction to that reported by Sklar et al., 2012) when raw data were analyzed, this effect did not hold in the log transformed analysis, and was potentially also explained by a criterion effect, evidenced by a reliable difference in judgments on the perceptual awareness scale.
One potential cause of this failure to replicate could be a low-level factor: differences in visual co-occurrence statistics between words in English and Hebrew (i.e., the frequency with which words tend to appear together in a sentence). For instance, English lexical co-occurrence statistics might have worked against any effect of semantics. Study 2 contrasted sentences that were better matched.
Study 2
In Study 2 participants were again presented with sentences under suppression, and we again varied whether or not the sentences were semantically anomalous. But this time, we aimed to control for a variety of lower-level features (e.g., the shapes of This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
individual words, lexical co-occurrences, and so forth) by using reversible pairs of sentences. In control sentences, an animate actor performed a plausible action, for example, Mike ate the steak; the semantically anomalous sentences reversed the order of actor and theme (e.g., The steak ate Mike). As such, these pairs of sentences varied in meaning, but their lower-level properties were tightly matched. In addition, compared with Study 1, this study had higher power to detect any effect of unconscious semantic processing because we used 150 pairs of reversed sentences (i.e., 150 sentences per condition and 300 trials in total per participant), which gave us 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.29. This study used the same participants, procedure, and analysis as Study 1.
Analysis and Results
After removing timeouts (median ϭ 0 trials per participant [range ϭ 0 -119; two participants were extreme outliers]), we applied the same exclusion criteria as Study 1. Five participants were excluded along with 6% of the remaining trials (median ϭ 12.5 trials per participant [range ϭ 2-59]). With these exclusions, we still had 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.3. Our mixed effects analysis had the form RT ϳ Sentence Type ϩ Sentence Length ϩ (1 ϩ Sentence Type|Participant) ϩ (1 ϩ Sentence Type|Item); this is the same structure as in Study 1, except that we treated each reversible pair of sentences as a single item, and included a random by-item predictor to account for how the effect of sentence type might vary across different pairs of sentences (analogously to how it might vary between participants). Figure 2 shows that, just like Study 1, Study 2 produced no evidence for unconscious sentence processing. When the raw response time data were analyzed using a paired t test, we found no effect of sentence type: the sentence's meaning did not influence response times (M control ϭ 1,463 ms, SD ϭ 549; M violation ϭ 1,463 ms, SD ϭ 536), t(47) ϭ 0.02, p ϭ .98. Our subsequent analyses confirmed this. There was no effect of sentence type for logtransformed response times analyzed using a t test (M control ϭ 7.20 log ms, SD ϭ 0.37; M violation ϭ 7.20 log ms, SD ϭ 0.37), t(47) ϭ 0.86, p ϭ .39, nor under the mixed effects analysis, B ϭ 0.005(0.006), t ϭ 0.8, p ϭ .42.
In this study, and similarly to the RT analysis, we found no difference between conditions in the Perceptual Awareness Scale ratings (M control ϭ 1.84, SD ϭ 0.50; M violation ϭ 1.84, SD ϭ 0.50), t(47) ϭ .25, p ϭ .81.
Discussion
Study 2, like Study 1, failed to replicate the previous demonstration that sentences could be interpreted without awareness, even while using a larger set of stimuli that were designed to more-precisely control for any low-level perceptual features. However, one concern about the findings of Studies 1 and 2 is that our continuous flash suppression manipulation may have been too strong: Perhaps no aspect of the suppressed stimuli used here, including their lower level properties, would have influenced participants' responses, thus blocking any access to semantics. To test this idea, we drew on prior findings that suppression times are sensitive to the amount of low level information that is present in a suppressed stimulus. For instance, suppression times are shorter when suppressed images are more complex or larger (e.g., for words containing more characters, Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014; Heyman & Moors, 2014 , Yang & Blake, 2012 . If our flash suppression manipulation had been too strong, then lower-level factors should not affect suppression times. We used a mixed effects model to regress response time against the length of each stimulus in characters (centered and standardized), collapsing across Studies 1 and 2. Longer sentences were indeed faster to break suppression, B ϭ Ϫ0.02(0.007), t ϭ 3.2, p ϭ .002, indicating that low level features of our stimuli influenced participants' response times, even if high level features of those stimuli, like meaning, did not.
A second reasonable worry about the choice of stimuli in this study-semantically unusual versus neutral sentences-is that they may not provide the strongest test of unconscious language processing and the proposed (Hassin, 2013 ) "Yes It Can" principle of unconscious cognition. In their Experiments 4 and 5, Sklar et al. (2012) found that phrases with negatively valenced meanings, like electric chair, broke suppression faster than neutral phrases like dining table, even though the individual words in each phrase were always neutral. Because that finding echoes demonstrations that fearful faces break suppression faster than neutral faces (Yang et al., 2007) , it may be more robust, and we therefore attempted to replicate this effect of valence in Studies 3 and 4.
Studies 3 and 4
Study 3 was a replication of Sklar et al.'s (2012) Experiment 4, using English versions of their stimuli. In Study 4, like in Study 2, we used reversible sentences to assess whether suppression times were affected by a sentence's valence while controlling for lower level visual and lexical properties (e.g., comparing the baby hit the brick vs. the brick hit the baby). As with Studies 1 and 2, the data for Studies 3 and 4 (as well as Study 5, described below) were collected in the same testing session, and trials for the different studies were randomly intermingled.
Study 3 Method
Participants. 73 students (47 female, mean age 21, range 18 -24) from the University of Edinburgh community participated, and were paid £7.10 an hour. All identified English as their native language from birth and had normal or corrected vision with no color blindness. This number of subjects gave us 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.49. The original study's effect size was 0.38 but, given the number of stimuli used, we would not have been able to reach 80% power even with infinite participants (Westfall et al., 2014) . In addition, testing 73 participants ensured that we followed the "Small Telescopes" recommendation (Simonsohn, 2015 ) that, when a study is replicated using a sample 2.5 times larger than the original, it has 80% power to reject the original study's effect size as the true underlying effect size (the original study used only 28 participants).
Materials. Each participant saw 50 English phrases, 24 with neutral emotional affectivity and 26 negative. 34 phrases were taken from the English translations of the 45 Hebrew stimuli used in Sklar et al.'s (2012) Experiments 4a, 4b, and 5. Those stimuli judged to be too specific to Israeli culture or composed of more This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
than two words in translation (e.g., "a stake in the eye") were replaced with suitable alternatives.
To confirm the valence of the phrases, they were rated by 649 workers on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Each worker was paid to rate up to 15 stimuli, using an affective scale ranging from Ϫ5 to 5, where negative scores were given to emotionally negative stimuli and positive scores to positive stimuli. On average, each stimulus received 50 ratings. An independent samples t test performed on the mean ratings of the stimuli confirmed a significant difference between the phrases that we had prelabeled as negative and neutral (neutral M ϭ 0.6, SD ϭ 0.5; negative M ϭ Ϫ2.9, SD ϭ 1.0), t(25) ϭ 14.6, p Ͻ .001. However, the mean ratings for the constituent words of the negative and neutral phrases were overall neutral (0.33, SD ϭ 1.0).
2 A full list of experimental items is available in the supplemental materials.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as Study 1, except for a modification of the perceptual rating scale, with participants' experiences being rated as no text, blurry text, almost clear text, and absolutely clear text.
Analyses. After removing trials that timed out (median ϭ 0 trials per participant [range ϭ 0 -22]), we followed Sklar et al.'s (2012) exclusion criteria. Two participants were excluded along with 3% of remaining trials (median ϭ 2 trials per participant [range ϭ 0 -6]). With these exclusions, we still had 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.49.
We again analyzed the data in three ways. First, we followed Sklar et al. (2012) by conducting a by-items regression of raw response time against valence score. Second, we conducted the same analysis on log transformed response times. Finally, we analyzed the log response times using a linear mixed effects models to simultaneously account for length, participants and items. Our model had the structure RT ϳ Valence Score ϩ Phrase Length ϩ (1 ϩ Valence Score|Participant) ϩ (1|Item); this accounts for the fact that each participant produced responses to many different items with different valences, but that each item only had a single valence score.
Results
Our results were very similar to those of Study 1. Again, raw suppression times varied slightly as a function of affective valence (see Figure 3) , but in the opposite direction to that found by Sklar et al. (2012) , and not in a statistically significant fashion, B ϭ Ϫ0.018(0.012), t ϭ 1.5, p ϭ .14. There was also no effect in the log transformed data, B ϭ Ϫ0.008(0.007), t ϭ 1.3, p ϭ .19. When analyzed using mixed effects models accounting for length, there was, however, a marginal effect of semantics, B ϭ Ϫ0.011(0.006), t ϭ 1.9, p ϭ .06, but still in the unexpected direction.
Unlike Study 1, where phrase meaning had affected ratings on the Perceptual Awareness Scale, here we did not find any such effect, B ϭ Ϫ0.007(0.01), t ϭ 0.5, p ϭ .59.
Study 4
Study 4 was analogous to Study 2, including in its motivation: We aimed to test whether emotional valence might affect the suppression time of sentences when their lower level features were more precisely controlled. To do this, we again compared reversible pairs of phrases which had very different valences.
Method
Methods were the same as Study 3, except that we used 28 pairs of English sentences whose valence strongly changed when their agent and theme were reversed, as rated by Amazon Mechanical Turk users (e.g., The baby hit the brick vs. The brick hit the baby). Affectivity ratings were significantly different between negative and neutral sentences (neutral M ϭ Ϫ0.1, SD ϭ 1.7; negative M ϭ Ϫ3.5, SD ϭ 1.1) t(27) ϭ 9.9, p Ͻ .001. This number of stimuli and subjects gave us 80% power to detect an effect of 0.41 or larger.
After removing trials that timed out (median ϭ 0 trials per participant [range ϭ 0 -12]), we used the same exclusion criteria as Study 3. Five participants were excluded along with 3% of the remaining trials (median ϭ 2 trials per participant [range ϭ 0 -4]). With these exclusions, we still had 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.41. Our mixed effects analysis had the form RT ϳ Valence Score ϩ Length ϩ (1 ϩ Valence Score|Participant) ϩ (1 ϩ Valence Score|Item), accounting for the fact that each participant responded to multiple different items with different valence, and that each item (a pair of reversible sentences) could have two valences.
Results
As in Study 2, we found no effect of affective valence on response time once low-level factors were controlled for (see Figure 3 ). This was true for raw data, B ϭ Ϫ0.006(0.01), t ϭ 0.5, p ϭ .62, and log-transformed data, B ϭ Ϫ0.003(0.006), t ϭ 0.5, p ϭ .62, and also held under a mixed effects model analysis that accounted for the pairings between items, B ϭ Ϫ0.002(0.006), t ϭ 0.39, p ϭ .69. Again, therefore, the data provided no evidence for unconscious semantic combination.
As in Study 3, phrase meaning did not affect ratings on the Perceptual Awareness Scale, B ϭ 0.002(0.01), t ϭ 0.2, p ϭ .81.
Study 5
Given that Studies 1 through 4 did not uncover evidence for combinatorial semantic processing, we considered alternative causes of Sklar et al.'s (2012) original results. For example, might the semantic characteristics of their Hebrew stimuli have been unwittingly correlated with certain lower-level visual characteristics? We therefore conducted a further replication of their original Experiments 4 and 5 (i.e., our Study 3), but in which English speakers saw phrases in the original Hebrew script. If lower-level visual differences explained the original findings, then we might expect negatively valenced words to break suppression faster in our sample, even though participants could not possibly have processed their meaning.
2 However, the words we used in negative phrases were probably more negative than those words used by Sklar et al. (2012) . This was because the English translations of their stimuli, provided in their appendix, had a stronger negative valence than their Hebrew counterparts, a fact that we only discovered after testing. Because the presence of negative words should slightly increase the overall negativity of the negative sentences, it should also increase the chances of negatively valenced phrases breaking suppression faster in this study, and so this error cannot explain any failure to replicate. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
In addition, to confirm our participants' sensitivity to the visual properties of the suppressed words in Studies 3 through 5, we conducted two further tests. First, we assessed whether suppression times would be shorter when the contrast of the suppressed phrases of Study 5 was higher. We presented each Hebrew stimulus twice; on one presentation it was shown at a maximum of 50% contrast, and on one presentation it was shown at a maximum of 80% contrast.
Second, we tried to replicate a finding from Jiang et al. (2007) , that words in familiar written scripts (i.e., English) break suppression faster than words from unfamiliar scripts (in this case, Hebrew). We compared response times to the Hebrew phrases from this study with response times to the English phrases from Studies 3 and 4, while controlling for both length and contrast.
Method
Study 5 used the same participants and procedure as Studies 3 and 4, and its trials were intermingled with those studies. Participants saw 45 Hebrew phrases twice each, at two different contrast levels (order of presentation was randomized). Low contrast phrases ramped up from 0% to 50% over 700 ms (as in our previous studies), and high contrast phrases ramped up from 0% to 80% over 70 ms.
We conducted separate power analyses for each of our planned assessments. For the valenced Hebrew phrases assessment, we had 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.51, for the assessment of visual contrast we had 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.34, and for the comparison of English and Hebrew we had 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.33.
Analysis and Results
After removing trials that timed out (median ϭ 0 trials per participant [range ϭ 0 -21]), we used the same exclusion criteria as Study 3. Five participants were excluded along with 4% of the remaining trials (median ϭ 3 trials per participant [range ϭ 1-10]). These exclusions did not importantly change the effect sizes that we could detect at 80% power (Hebrew valence: 0.52; visual contrast: 0.35; Hebrew-English: 0.33).
We analyzed the effects of Hebrew valence and contrast simultaneously using a linear regression, as in Study 3, predicting response times for each item as a function of its valence and contrast. We also used a mixed effects analysis of the form RT ϳ Contrast ‫ء‬ Valence ϩ Length ϩ (Contrast ‫ء‬ Valence|Participant) ϩ (Contrast|Item); this analysis accounts for how each participant responded to multiple different items of different contrasts and valence, and for how each individual item was seen at two contrast levels.
There was no evidence that the original findings were confounded by low-level visual features. As shown in Figure 3 , phrases with lower affective valence scores were no faster to break suppression. This was true for raw data, B ϭ 0.0016(0.011), t ϭ 0.16, p ϭ .88, and log-transformed data, B ϭ 0.003(0.006), t ϭ 0.49, p ϭ .62, and also held under a mixed effects model analysis, B ϭ 0.002(0.007), t ϭ 0.28, p ϭ .78. This null effect did not differ across the contrast levels (all p values Ͼ .70 across all analyses).
Our subsequent analyses confirmed that participants were sensitive to the visual properties of the suppressed words. As expected, we found that participants responded faster to phrases that were presented in higher contrast, B ϭ Ϫ0.072(0.007), t ϭ 10.4, p Ͻ .0001.
Interestingly, we also found evidence consistent with Jiang et al.'s (2007) claim that suppression times are longer for words in unfamiliar scripts. We compared response times to the 45 lowcontrast Hebrew phrases used in Study 5 with response times to the 106 English phrases used in Studies 3 and 4, using a mixed effects regression of the form RT ϳ Language ϩ Phrase Length ϩ (1 ϩ Language ϩ Phrase Length|Participant) ϩ (1|Item). This model accounted for the fact that each participant saw different items of different lengths from each language, but that each item had only a single length and language. The model indicated that English phrases broke suppression faster than Hebrew phrases (English: M ϭ 1.58 s, SD ϭ 1.0; Hebrew: 1.67 s, SD ϭ 1.1) when matched on contrast and controlling for length, B ϭ 0.03(0.01), t ϭ 2.8, p ϭ .005.
Phrase meaning did not affect ratings on the Perceptual Awareness Scale, B ϭ Ϫ0.004 (0.008), t ϭ 0.55, p ϭ .58, but high contrast stimuli were perceived more clearly, B ϭ 0.05 (0.008), This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
t ϭ 5.8, p Ͻ .001; this is unsurprising due to the continuous ramp-up of stimulus contrast in each trial: Even if a suppressed stimulus had broken into awareness before its contrast had reached maximum, in the time it took the participant to press the key to report detection, contrast would have continued to increase (and do so to a greater extent in the high-contrast condition, leading to higher visibility). Contrast and semantics did not interact, B ϭ 0.005(0.008), t ϭ 0.6, p ϭ .54. Study 5 therefore shows that participants are sensitive to a number of low level visual properties of suppressed sentences, but that these properties cannot easily explain the results of Sklar et al. (2012) .
Discussion
Like Studies 1 and 2, Studies 3 and 4 provided little evidence that word meanings could be combined without awareness. This was the case for English phrases that were highly similar to those used by Sklar et al. (2012; Study 3) , and for sentences with better-controlled visual properties (Study 4). However, the results of Study 5 rule out a simple alternative explanation of the original Hebrew findings based on low level visual properties, and also confirm that our participants could process the visual properties of the suppressed stimuli (as indicated by the fact that stimulus length and familiarity of the alphabet used did affect breakthrough time). In addition, Studies 3 and 4 provided no evidence that participants used different criteria to respond to more versus less emotionally valenced phrases, which contrasts with the findings of Study 1; we return to this point in the General Discussion.
In combination, Studies 1 through 5 fail to provide consistent support for unconscious semantic composition, but also provide no insight into why those results might have been found in the original report of Sklar et al. (2012) . However, a hint of a pattern did emerge across these studies: when data were log transformed prior to analysis, the p values of our statistical tests tended to move away from the significance level of 0.05. We return to this point later.
The following studies assess two further explanations of our failure to find evidence that combinatorial semantics is processed outside awareness. Studies 6 through 9 test whether the failure can be explained by simple differences between our CFS procedure and Sklar et al.'s (2012) procedure, by replicating Studies 1 through 4 using their stimulus presentation scripts. Study 10 tests whether participants may find it easier to unconsciously process semantics when words are presented closer to fixation.
Studies 6 Through 9
We are grateful to the authors of Sklar et al. (2012) for generously sharing their stimulus presentation scripts with us. These presented stimuli in a roughly similar fashion to ours; perhaps the most important difference was that participants did not complete a Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) at the end of each trial. Our use of the PAS in the first five studies may have reduced participants' "flow," or engagement with the task, by interrupting transitions from one trial to the next, thus potentially impairing the processing of stimuli during the experiment (R. Hassin, personal communication, June 2016). We used these scripts to conduct a single session comprising four studies that replicated the key contrasts tested in our previous studies. (74) to ensure that these studies had sufficient power to detect any effect.
General Method
Participants. Seventy-four students (50 female, mean age 21, range 18 -30) from the University of Edinburgh community participated, paid £7.10 an hour. All identified English as their native language from birth and had normal or corrected vision with no color blindness. This gave us 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.37 in Study 6, of size 0.25 in Study 7, of size 0.49 in Study 8, and of size 0.40 in Study 9.
Procedure and materials. The procedure was implemented in Matlab using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997) . It was similar to our previous studies, but Mondrian masks now alternated at 10 Hz (rather than 60 Hz), trials timed out after 20 s, and there was no perceptual rating scale at the end of each trial. We used the same sentence stimuli as in Studies 1 through 4, but did not intermingle these stimuli. Instead, participants received the studies in one of two orders: Study 6, Study 8, Study 7, Study 9 or Study 8, Study 6, Study 9, Study 7, with orders split equally between participants. We reasoned that this procedure, in which studies using Sklar et al.'s (2012) original stimuli were presented before participants became fatigued, had the highest likelihood of replicating Sklar et al.'s (2012) original findings.
Analysis and results. The data were analyzed in the same fashion as Studies 1 through 4. As in Studies 1 and 2, Studies 6 and 7 compared conditions (violation vs. control sentences) using t tests on raw and log transformed data, as well as mixed effects regressions. As in Studies 3 and 4, Studies 8 and 9 used by-items regressions to assess whether suppression time varied as a function of sentence meaning (comparing raw data and log transformed data), and also used an additional mixed effects regression.
Exclusions were calculated per study, based on the procedures described in Studies 1 and 3. For Study 6, we excluded timeouts This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
80% power to detect an effect of size 0.38 in Study 6, of size 0.27 in Study 7, of size 0.5 in Study 8, and of size 0.48 in Study 9.
Study 6 (Replication of Study 1)
When we analyzed participants' raw response times, we found that they did in fact vary as a function of unconscious semantics, a result that had been marginal in our Study 1 (see Figure 4) . Again, however, this effect was in the opposite direction to that found by Sklar et al. (2012) : Violation sentences were slower to break suppression than control sentences (M control ϭ 1,825 ms, SD ϭ 663; M violation ϭ 1,913 ms, SD ϭ 784), t(61) ϭ 2.4, p ϭ .02. However, when we accounted for the positive skew of the data via a log transformation, this effect was no longer significant (M control ϭ 7.39 log ms, SD ϭ 0.36; M violation ϭ 7.41 log ms, SD ϭ 0.39), t(61) ϭ 1.7, p ϭ .09, and it was also not significant in the mixed effects regression that included length as a covariate, B ϭ 0.02(0.02), t ϭ 1.4, p ϭ .17.
Study 7 (Replication of Study 2)
Our original Study 2 provided no evidence that sentences were processed unconsciously, and the same was true here (see Figure  4 ) for raw response times (M control ϭ 1,323 ms, SD ϭ 345; M violation ϭ 1,323 ms, SD ϭ 353), t(61) ϭ 0.09, p ϭ .93, for log transformed response times (M control ϭ 7.13 log ms, SD ϭ 0.28; M violation ϭ 7.13 log ms, SD ϭ 0.29), t(63) ϭ 0.41, p ϭ .67, and under the mixed effects regression analysis, B ϭ Ϫ0.002(0.006), t ϭ 0.37, p ϭ .71. Note that response times were much shorter in Study 7 than Study 6, presumably because participants had adapted to the CFS by the time Study 7 was run (in both possible orders, Study 6 preceded Study 7).
Study 8 (Replication of Study 3)
While the results of our original Study 3 were marginally significant, we found no evidence that semantics affected response times in this replication (see Figure 4) . This was true for both raw response times, B ϭ 0.02(0.03), t(48) ϭ 0.88, p ϭ .38, log response times, B ϭ 0.009(0.01), t(48) ϭ 0.83, p ϭ .41, and the mixed effects regression, B ϭ 0.005(0.009), t ϭ 0.54, p ϭ .58. Indeed, the effect was numerically in the opposite direction to that found in our Study 3.
Study 9 (Replication of Study 4)
While our original Study 4 did not find an effect of semantics, participants in this replication were reliably slower to respond to neutral sentences, B ϭ 0.033(0.014), t ϭ 2.4, p ϭ .02, at least in the raw data (see Figure 4) . However, this effect was entirely driven by the positive skew in participants' RTs, and it disappeared when the data were log transformed before analysis, B ϭ 0.007(0.008), t ϭ 0.9, p ϭ .40, and also when analyzed in the mixed effects regression, B ϭ 0.01(0.02), t ϭ 0.61, p ϭ .54. Note that response times were much shorter in Study 9 than Study 8 (which always preceded Study 9), presumably because participants had adapted to the CFS.
Order of Presentation Analysis
We also examined if participants showed greater evidence of unconscious processing before becoming fatigued, that is, when completing the very first task (recall that half of our participants completed Sklar et al.'s, 2012 
Discussion
Although Studies 6 through 9 used the same presentation parameters and Matlab presentation scripts as Sklar et al. (2012) , Figure 4 . Results of Studies 6 -9 (replicating Studies 1 through 4) using the original presentation scripts of Sklar et al. (2012) . Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals around the mean, blue lines indicate estimated linear fits of valence to response times, and ribbons around lines indicate 95% confidence intervals around the estimates. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
they still failed to produce evidence that the meanings of words are composed together without awareness. While two of the studies did produce marginal or significant effects when the raw data were analyzed (one of which was in the opposite direction to the findings in Sklar et al., 2012) , these effects disappeared when the data were log transformed to normalize the response times. We return to the importance of this point in the General Discussion.
Study 10
The phrases and sentences used in Sklar et al. (2012) were typically shorter (in terms of characters) than those used in our studies, because vowels in Hebrew words are typically inferred rather than written. One consequence of this is that their Hebrew stimuli would have been presented, on average, closer to the fovea, and the increased resolution with which such stimuli are perceived could, potentially, have made unconscious processing easier.
To test whether semantic access occurs for stimuli that can more easily be fixated or foveated, we moved from sentences to single words. Study 10 followed-up the experiments of Yang and Yeh (2011) , who demonstrated that the meanings of Chinese words influence response times in a breaking CFS paradigm. However, their task had two potential problems. First, they only used 12 different negative and neutral words per condition (repeated four times), which increases the possibility that semantics may have been confounded with lower level visual features. Second, participants' responses in the task (indicating when a stimulus appeared) were not independent of the nature of the stimulus.
3
In Study 10, instead, we used a higher power test (150 words per valence condition and 28 participants, compared with 12 words and 12 participants in the original report), and repeated the same procedure used in our previous studies. On each trial, participants saw a single word that had either a neutral or negatively valenced meaning, and indicated whether it lay above or below a fixation cross. We crossed the semantic manipulation with a manipulation of length: words were either short (three or four letters) or long (seven to 12 letters). If distance from the fovea affects unconscious processing such that shorter words are perceived more clearly, then valence may modulate breakthrough times for short words to a greater extent than for long words.
Method
Participants. Twenty-eight participants (16 female) were recruited under the same terms as our previous studies. Due to an experimenter error, age was not recorded, but the participants were drawn from the same University of Edinburgh population as our previous studies. This gave us 80% power to detect any effect larger than 0.39; the two studies in the original paper had effect sizes of 0.43 and 0.41.
Materials and procedure. Participants saw a set of 300 words that crossed length (short/long) with meaning valence (neutral/negative, based on the 9-point valence scale taken from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) database of the University of Florida, Bradley & Lang, 1999) . Short neutral and short negative words were matched for length (neutral mean: 3.8 characters, SD ϭ 0.4; negative: 3.7, SD ϭ 0.5) but not for rated valence (neutral: 5.3, SD ϭ 0.3; negative: 2.7, SD ϭ 0.5). Long neutral and long negative words were also matched for length (neutral: 8.1, SD ϭ 1.2; negative: 8.2, SD ϭ 1.2) but not rated valence (neutral: 5.3, SD ϭ 0.3; negative: 2.7, SD ϭ 0.5). Long words were significantly longer than short words, and negative words were rated significantly lower than neutral words (both p Ͻ .001). Order of presentation was randomized. The CFS display parameters were otherwise similar to the procedure in Studies 6 through 9 (i.e., no perceptual rating scale, and mondrians presented at 10 Hz), but we set the trial timeout to be 8 s and programmed the study in PsychoPy rather than the Psychophysics Toolbox.
Analysis and results. We excluded timeout trials (median 0 trials per participant [range ϭ 0 -137; the outlier participant who yielded the upper extreme of this range was subsequently excluded]), and two participants who were accurate on less than 90% of trials or whose mean response time was greater than 3 standard deviations from the group mean (as a result, we had 80% power to detect an effect of size 0.40). We then excluded trials on which participants answered incorrectly, and trials on which response time was less than 200 ms (removing 1% of the data, median ϭ 3.5 trials per participant [range ϭ 0 -6]). We analyzed the resulting data using a linear mixed effects model of the form RT ϳ Length ‫ء‬ Valence ϩ (1 ϩ Length ‫ء‬ Valence|Participant) ϩ (1|Item), accounting for the fact that each participant saw items that crossed length with valence, but that each item only had one length and valence. We analyzed both raw data (as in Yang & Yeh, 2011) and log transformed data.
The resulting analyses (see Figure 5) were consistent with our previous findings. When we analyzed the raw data, we found that suppression times were reduced for longer words (M short ϭ 1,307 ms, SD ϭ 584; M long ϭ 1,476 ms, SD ϭ 614; B ϭ 0.18(0.04), t ϭ 4.2, p Ͻ .001) but were unaffected by the meanings of those words (M neutral ϭ 1,412 ms, SD ϭ 622; M negative ϭ 1,372 ms, SD ϭ 589; B ϭ 0.04(0.03), t ϭ 1.3, p ϭ .18), and these factors did not interact, B ϭ Ϫ0.01(0.05), t ϭ 0.2, p ϭ .82. The analysis of the log transformed data reinforced this point. Again, length had a significant effect (M short ϭ 7.12 log ms, SD ϭ 0.35; M long ϭ 7.01 log ms, SD ϭ 0.35), B ϭ 0.11(0.02), t ϭ 6.4, p Ͻ .001 but semantics had no effect (M neutral ϭ 7.08 log ms, SD ϭ 0.36; M negative ϭ 7.06 log ms, SD ϭ 0.35), B ϭ 0.02(0.02), t ϭ 1.1, p ϭ .27 and these two factors did not interact, B ϭ Ϫ0.0003(0.02), t ϭ 0.012, p ϭ .99.
In summary, even when single words were viewed near to fixation, their meanings did not affect suppression times. It therefore seems unlikely that the null findings from Studies 1 through 9 can be explained through a failure to foveate the critical stimuli.
Discussion and Meta-Analysis
Our 10 studies consistently failed to find evidence that participants could process the meanings of English words that were masked from awareness using continuous flash suppression. This was true for sentences, for two-word phrases, and for single words.
But while each study in isolation may not have contributed much evidential value, might the full combination of studies reveal a more subtle effect?
We conducted two meta-analyses. First we assessed the effect of semantics on raw response times. Although we were skeptical of the raw response time analyses given the data's severe positive skew, this analysis allowed us to combine our studies with the relevant findings of Sklar et al. (2012) and Yang and Yeh (2011) , to provide a more precise estimate of any effect size. Then, in a second meta-analysis, we assessed log transformed response times, with the dataset restricted to the studies reported here.
Raw response time meta-analysis. We calculated the effect of semantics in each of our studies, along with Sklar et al.'s (2012) Experiments 1, 2, 4a, and 4b, and Yang and Yeh's (2011) Experiments 1 and 2 (see Figure 6 ). For ease of interpretation, our Study 10 was divided into two: an effect of semantics on recognizing long words (10a), and an effect on recognizing short words (10b). These effect sizes were entered into a multilevel random effects metaregression (Viechtbauer, 2010) ; this type of model assumes that each effect size is a randomly drawn estimate of a true population effect size, and weights each effect size by its sample size. We used a multilevel regression in order to model each effect size as being drawn from a different lab in Scotland, Israel, or Taiwan). Across all 16 studies, the estimated overall effect size was Ϫ0.049 (SE ϭ 0.12), which was not significantly different from zero, Z ϭ 0.39, p ϭ .70, 95% CI [Ϫ0.29, 0.20].
We then used a meta-analytic Bayes Factor analysis (Rouder & Morey, 2011) to evaluate whether the estimated overall effect was more consistent with the null hypothesis, in which there is no effect of unconscious language processing, or with a less informative hypothesis, that is agnostic as to whether or not there is an effect of unconscious language processing, such that the true effect size could lie anywhere on a uniform distribution between 1 and Ϫ1, including 0. We calculated a meta-analytic Bayes Factor (i.e., the ratio of evidence for the alternative hypothesis over evidence for the null hypothesis) using the function meta.ttestBF in the R package BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2015;  we edited this function to account for comparisons between paired samples). A Bayes Factor over 3 is typically taken as evidence for the alternative hypothesis, while a Bayes Factor under 0.33 is typically taken as evidence for the null. The resulting Bayes Factor was 0.27, suggesting that this set of experimental results was four times more likely under the null hypothesis than the alternative.
We thus estimate that there is no overall effect of semantics on suppression times. However, we note that our metaregression did also show considerable heterogeneity in its estimates (Cochran's Q(15) ϭ 64.6, p Ͻ .001), so it remains possible that subtle differences in method and procedure, in population, or in the language used, may have led to important differences in the results of the three different labs under test.
Log response time meta-analysis. Our second meta-analysis was restricted to the log transformed response times, which had reduced the effects of skewed data and provided results that were more stable and consistent across our studies. A random effects metaregression (see Figure 7 ) estimated that the overall effect size was Ϫ0.0049 (SE ϭ 0.018). This estimate was also not significantly different from 0, Z ϭ 0.27, p ϭ .78, 95% CI [Ϫ0.04, 0.03], and again a Bayes Factor analysis, with the same parameters as before, favored the null hypothesis over the uninformative one (a Bayes Factor of 0.12, suggesting that the data is almost 8 times more likely under the null).
In combination, these two meta-analyses suggest that there is unlikely to be an effect of semantics on suppression times, but that if one does exist then (a) that effect is likely to be very small; (b) the sign of that effect is uncertain (i.e., whether it is facilitory or inhibitory); and (c) that effect may not generalize across languages. . Forest plot of effect sizes calculated from the raw data analyses from the current studies, from Experiments 1, 2, 4a, and 4b of Sklar et al. (2012) , and from Experiments 1 and 2 of Yang and Yeh (2011). Cohen's d effect size estimates were calculated from the relevant t and F statistics of each study. For comparisons between paired samples, we followed Dunlap, Cortina, Vascow, and Burke (1996) and adjusted for the correlation between participants' responses in each condition. We calculated these correlations exactly for our studies (range from 0.94 -0.99) and estimated the correlations to be 0.975 for the remaining studies. The "All Studies" estimate is taken from a random effects metaregression model. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
General Discussion
Across 10 high power continuous flash suppression studies, we consistently found no evidence that the semantics of an English phrase (or word) affects the efficacy with which that phrase can be suppressed from awareness. This contrasts with previous findings, from Hebrew and from Chinese, in which semantic information appeared to be processed during continuous flash suppression.
Why did our studies produce such different results? One possibility is that the English alphabet or language is simply not amenable to unconscious processing. We do not believe that this possibility is particularly plausible. Both Hebrew and English use alphabetic writing systems, meaning that orthographic processing is relatively similar in both (indeed, it may be harder in Hebrew as vowels must usually be inferred) and there is no good reason to assume that unconscious processing should be more attuned to the grammatical and lexical features of Hebrew than features of English.
Chinese words are perhaps slightly different; in particular, it is possible that individual Chinese characters are more amenable to unconscious processing than Hebrew or English letters, as their symbolism is more iconic and less arbitrary. However, this factor also makes it harder to rule out the hypothesis that the effects found in Yang and Yeh (2011) were not in fact caused by the semantics of the presented words, but by their lower level visual features. Indeed, the small number of stimuli used in their experiments (12 words per condition in Experiment 1, 16 words per condition in Experiment 2) make it very plausible that correlations may have existed between high-level semantics and low-level features. We thus conclude that there are few good reasons to believe that different languages are differentially susceptible to unconscious semantic processing.
Another possibility is that confounding aspects of the experimental paradigm may have caused prior results. For example, participants may have set different detection criteria for judging when phrases of different meaning emerged into consciousness. However, the Perceptual Awareness Scale included in our first five studies uncovered minimal evidence for this: While there was some evidence that different criteria were used in Study 1, that finding did not replicate in subsequent studies. Finally, it is also possible that our failure to replicate was driven by subtle methodological differences between our apparatus/testing conditions, and the methods used in prior work. For example, although our Studies 6 through 9 used the same presentations scripts as Sklar et al. (2012) , the task was carried out under slightly different conditions: The level of illumination in our testing room was lower and the viewing distance between observer and stimuli was greater (R. Hassin, January 2017, personal communication) . But while factors like this might explain why suppression times in our study were longer than those in Sklar et al. (2012) , 4 they do not naturally explain why we failed to find the expected differences between stimulus categories, given that the text used in our studies was perfectly legible (when read without suppression).
We thus wish to focus on an alternative explanation, which is not based on any experimental factor or confound, but rather on the distributional characteristics of response data in experiments that use the "breaking continuous flash suppression" (b-CFS) method.
The Potential for False Positives in the Breaking CFS Paradigm
b-CFS data are well known to have positive skew and kurtosis, and it is surprising that more studies do not analyze the resulting data with a log transformation to ensure a better approximation to a normal distribution. Indeed, our analyses of raw response times produced more statistical comparisons that were marginal or significant than our analysis of log transformed response times, which may be expected because strong skew or kurtosis are likely to invalidate key assumptions of parametric statistical tests (e.g., the normality of residuals).
But while parametric assumptions are important, here we want to propose a different idea: Strongly skewed data can lead to a high rate of false positives when combined with fairly common procedures for excluding outlier trials from a dataset. In particular, in Experiments 1 and 2 of Sklar et al. (2012) , data points were excluded from analysis if they fell more than 3 standard deviations from the grand mean of each condition (i.e., separate standard deviations were calculated for each condition). As we show below, this type of exclusion criterion can bias the results of statistical tests.
Of particular concern is that the values of a skewed dataset's outliers strongly influence the size of that dataset's standard deviation, much more so than the values of points that are not outliers. In a skewed dataset, there will almost certainly be large differences between conditions in the specific values of outliers, which will cause commensurate differences in the size of a standard deviation, and, if those standard deviations are then used for exclusions, this effect will cascade up to cause differences in the means of the resulting samples. Importantly, this implies that excluding outliers based on their distance from each condition's overall mean leads to applying different exclusion criteria to different conditions. In other words, outliers are removed from different numerical ranges in different conditions; this, in turn, results in differential (and entirely artifactual) effects on each condition's postexclusion mean. The direction of this artifact-which condition's mean ends up being 4 Which were extremely short-less than 1 s on average. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
larger or smaller-is random, meaning that significant effects may fail to replicate, or that replication efforts would be just as likely to find the opposite effect as the original one. This mechanism can potentially explain the marginally significant result we found in our Study 1, which compared control sentences (I drank coffee) with violation sentences (I ironed the coffee). Applying the exclusion process to these two conditions meant that control trials were excluded if they fell more than 3,030 ms from the mean, whereas violation trials were excluded if they fell more than 3,140 ms from the mean. This extremely unequal exclusion criterion difference, of more than 100 ms, should cause the mean of control trials to be lower than the mean of violation trials. This problem is particularly marked for skewed data sets compared to normally distributed data sets, because in the former case more data points will lie close to the exclusion boundary, and so the exclusion point's value will have a larger effect on the resulting mean of the distribution.
This difference could thus easily explain the actual mean difference we found in our study: Control sentences were seen 35 ms faster than violation sentences. If the condition-specific-outlier exclusion criterion had not been applied, then control sentences would only have been seen 20 ms faster (a nonsignificant difference, p ϭ .53).
We illustrate the generality of this problem through a computational simulation. We generated a dataset in which 30 simulated participants took part in a two-condition experiment, each generating 50 trials per condition. Each participant's trials were drawn from a single exponential distribution whose rate was jittered (across participants) around 0.3, and the rate did not differ between the two conditions. The resulting data thus have positive skew but should not have a mean difference between conditions. We applied the by-condition exclusion procedure and analyzed the data using a t test. Then, to assess the effects of the by-condition exclusion procedure on this dataset, we analyzed the distribution of p values from the simulated dataset when it was resampled and retested. To do this resampling, we took the original dataset (prior to any exclusions), shuffled the mapping between condition labels and data points for each participant, applied the by-condition exclusion procedure again, and analyzed the data using a t test. We repeated this procedure 500 times in total. We then carried out the same overall procedure on a further 999 simulated data sets, to ensure the generality of the results.
As there is no difference between the conditions, the distribution of the resulting half a million p values should be roughly uniform between 0 and 1 (as p values are uniformly distributed under the null hypothesis). However, when we combined skewed data with a by-condition exclusion criterion, we instead found a spike of p values close to 0, that is, an increase in the rate of false positives. This can be seen in the density plots of p values in Figure 8 . The solid black line in Figure 8a shows the resampled p values from a skewed dataset combined with a by condition exclusion, and it clearly spikes close to 0. The dashed line shows results from the same simulated dataset, but analyzed without the by-condition exclusion procedure, and it does not spike close to 0. Figure 8b shows what happens when the same skewed data are log transformed prior to analysis. In this case, the high rate of false positives disappears, whether or not data are excluded. These qualitative impressions were confirmed through statistical analyses. We first used one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to assess whether the distributions of p values in Figures 8a and 8b diverged from uniformity. When the data was untransformed and the by-condition exclusion was applied, then the resulting distribution significantly diverged from uniformity (D ϭ 0.08 p Ͻ .001), but when the by-condition exclusion was not applied, then the resulting distribution did not significantly diverge from uniformity (D ϭ 0.002, p ϭ .18). When the data was log transformed prior to analysis, then the resulting distributions did not differ from uniformity whether the exclusion criteria were applied (D ϭ 0.002, p ϭ .14) or not (D ϭ 0.0008, p ϭ .92). We also used two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to assess whether the two distributions of p values in each of Figures 8a and 8b differed. When the data was untransformed, the two distributions significantly differed (D ϭ 0.08, p Ͻ .001), but when the data was log transformed, the two distributions did not significantly differ (D ϭ 0.001, p ϭ .73).
In sum, combining a by condition exclusion procedure with skewed data appears to enhance the false positive rate. This effect could potentially explain the marginal results we found in our own data sets: Figures 8c-f apply the same resampling logic to the data from Study 1 and its replication in Study 6 (for each study, we shuffled condition labels, excluded data, and conducted t-tests 5,000 times to generate a large number of p values). For both studies, there is a spike in p values when the by-condition exclusion is applied to positively skewed data, and this spike is less prominent when the data have been log transformed. Applying a by-condition exclusion significantly affected the distribution of p values when data were positively skewed (Study 1: D ϭ 0.14, p Ͻ .001; Study 6: D ϭ 0.073, p Ͻ .001) but not when data were log transformed (D ϭ 0.025, p ϭ .08; D ϭ 0.01, p ϭ .96). This raises the possibility that other studies that use raw response times in their analyses of b-CFS data may have been similarly affected.
To test this, we reanalyzed the data from Sklar et al.'s (2012) Experiments 1 and 2, which served as the basis for our own Studies 1 and 6. As expected, the response time data from that paper had positive skew; in fact the skew was much greater (9.5) than in our own Study 1 (where skew was 2.5). There was a significant difference between conditions when Experiment 1 (n ϭ 31 participants) was analyzed with the by-condition exclusion procedure (M control ϭ 959.1 ms, SD ϭ 203.1; M violation ϭ 939.9 ms, SD ϭ 202.8), t(30) ϭ 2.4, p ϭ .02 but not when it was analyzed without the exclusion procedure (M control ϭ 984.5 ms, SD ϭ 261.8), M violation ϭ 968.6 ms, SD ϭ 266.7), t(30) ϭ 1.7, p ϭ .11. A log transformation reduced positive skew, but did not eliminate it (1.5), and so we similarly found effects of condition with a by-condition exclusion procedure (M control ϭ 6.83, SD ϭ 0.19; M violation ϭ 6.82, SD ϭ 0.19), t(30) ϭ 2.2, p ϭ .04 but not without (M control ϭ 6.84, SD ϭ 0.21; M violation ϭ 6.83, SD ϭ 0.21), t(30) ϭ 1.6, p ϭ .12. However, a reciprocal transformation reduced positive skew entirely (in fact introducing slight negative skew of Ϫ0.34), and under this transformation there was no effect of condition either with the by-condition exclusion (M control ϭ 0.0011, SD ϭ 0.0002; M violation ϭ 0.001, SD ϭ 0.0002), t (30) Nevertheless, given the results of these simulations, we recommend that response time data from breaking CFS experiments always be analyzed with a transformation to reduce skew (e.g., a log or reciprocal transformation), and we strongly caution against using by-condition exclusion procedures, because this increases the potential for false positives.
Evidence for Unconscious Sentence Processing From Other Methods
Our data provide no evidence that the meanings of English sentences and words are processed once they have been rendered unconscious through continuous flash suppression. This could be because consciousness is required for processing sentences, or because the present method-breaking continuous flash suppression-is not an adequately sensitive measure. Indeed, evidence for unconscious sentence processing has been uncovered using CFS in different ways (i.e., other than b-CFS), or through using other techniques altogether. Axelrod, Bar, Rees, and Yovel (2015) used CFS to mask sentences that were presented during fMRI scans, and found activity in left hemisphere language areas. Van Gaal et al. (2014) and Armstrong and Dienes (2013) used visual masking to This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
investigate the processing of multiword expressions, and found that the meanings of such masked expressions influenced both measures. Finally, Batterink and Neville (2013) used ERPs to show that readers automatically calculate whether words fit their grammatical context, even when the word is read during an attentional blink (which, unlike CFS or masking, does not render the word invisible, but rather unattended). However, we suggest that much of this evidence is in fact amenable to other interpretations, and should not be taken as conclusive demonstrations that combinatorial semantic and syntactic processing occur without awareness. For example, Axelrod et al. (2015) compared the fMRI response to suppressed sentences with the response to suppressed strings of randomly combined letters. Such stimuli differ in a multitude of ways: Random strings of letters lack syntax and semantics, but also fail to obey the orthographic properties of their language and lack familiarity, and it would be premature to conclude that it was the high-level properties that drove their finding.
Other work, relying on temporal masking, has used more minimal linguistic contrasts as stimuli, but remains hard to interpret. Van Gaal et al. (2014) investigated how behavioral and ERP responses to valenced nouns (e.g., peace, murder) were affected by unconscious multiword primes (e.g., is the response to murder differentially affected by the primes not good vs. very good). However, while these primes did have a small effect on the ERP response to the valenced words, it is unclear what, precisely, the cause of that ERP effect might have been, because the primes did not have any effect on participants' behavioral response even when they were presented consciously. Indeed, it is unclear whether the negated phrases could even have been understood during the time window of the ERP analysis: While Van Gaal et al. (2014) found that negation affected the ERP response within 500ms, prior work has shown that the conscious processing of a negated phrase is extremely slow, and takes longer than 500 ms unless the discourse context leads the reader to expect that the phrase will contain negation (Clark & Chase, 1972; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008) . In van Gaal et al.'s (2014) experiment there was no discourse context, and so no expectation of negation.
The van Gaal et al. (2014) work is also subject to a recently raised methodological criticism (Sand & Nilsson, 2016; Vadillo, Konstantinidis, & Shanks, 2016) , that the study's explicit measure of awareness lacked statistical power compared to the main manipulation (80 trials in the awareness test, more than 1,000 trials in the main experiment), implying that some participants were likely to have been aware of the stimuli, but failed to statistically demonstrate this awareness in the awareness test. A similar point can be raised about Armstrong and Dienes (2013) , who also examined the effect of subliminal negation, and also used a low power procedure to measure individual masking thresholds. In addition, the threshold in their studies was defined subjectively rather than objectively, which raises the possibility that participants applied overly stringent criteria to reporting awareness under conditions of degraded visibility, but were actually aware, to an extent, of the masked stimuli.
Finally, Batterink and Neville (2013) suggested that syntactic processing might occur without awareness. Participants read sentences while simultaneously completing a cross-modal distraction task, such that they frequently failed to notice grammatical errors (e.g., We drank Lisa's by brandy . . .). Interestingly, the early ERP response to the ungrammatical word (by) was enhanced even when participants failed to notice the grammatical error. Batterink and Neville (2013) argued that this was indicative of unconscious syntactic processing (e.g., detecting that by is ungrammatical in its syntactic context) because early occurring ERP components have traditionally been proposed to index modular syntactic processing (Friederici, 2002; Friederici, Pfeifer, & Hahne, 1993; Neville, Nicol, Barss, Forster, & Garrett, 1991) . However, those traditional interpretations have recently been challenged. One alternative interpretation argues that these early components instead index mismatches between predicted sensory input and actual sensory input (e.g., the wordform by is visually surprising in a context in which a noun was expected, because this wordform is only used as a preposition, Dikker, Rabagliati, Farmer, & Pylkkänen, 2010; Dikker, Rabagliati, & Pylkkänen, 2009; Kim & Lai, 2012) ; under this account, the ERP response to by does not reflect combinatorial syntactic processing, but a sensory prediction error. A second, more deflationary account, has argued that early ERP responses to ungrammatical words might also result from artifacts caused by how ERP data are baseline corrected (Steinhauer & Drury, 2012) . Importantly, if responses to the preceding context words are used as a baseline, but those words are processed in systematically differently ways (e.g., because they are drawn from different parts of speech), then this type of correction can potentially cause a downstream difference in the ERP response to the target. Note that the three accounts mentioned here are not necessarily exclusive, as it is possible that, for example, both prediction errors and baseline correction could explain the quite long-lasting effects that Batterink and Neville (2013) found, but the existence of such diverse interpretations indicates that the precise cognitive implications of these ERP results remain unclear.
Moving away from sentence processing, our results are also inconsistent with some of the conclusions from a recent paper by Eo, Cha, Chong, and Kang (2016) . They found that a consciously presented prime did not affect participants' behavioral responses to a CFS-masked word, but did affect the N400 ERP componentalthough only when participants' attention was directed away from that suppressed word. Eo et al. (2016) argue that this featurefocusing attention away from the suppressed stimulus-may account for studies in which semantics affects CFS suppression times (as in Sklar et al., 2012 as well as Costello, Jiang, Baartman, McGlennen, & He, 2009 and Yeh, 2011) , because in those studies participants did not know the location of the suppressed stimulus and could not attend to it. However, participants in our experiments also did not know the location of the suppressed stimuli, and yet showed no evidence that they had accessed the meanings of those stimuli. In addition, Eo et al.'s (2016) proposed mechanism predicts increased breakthrough of unattended stimuli into awareness, which they do not report. We suggest that Eo et al.'s (2016) finding, while extremely interesting, require replication, as the effect of attention on semantic access has only been shown in a single study with a relatively small sample size (an n of 24).
Our arguments against unconscious sentence processing may well be rather deflationary, but they are also consistent with a growing body of work that has questioned the reliability and interpretation of studies of unconscious high level cognition This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. (Hesselmann, Darcy, Sterzer, & Knops, 2015; Hesselmann & Knops, 2014; Moors, Boelens, van Overwalle, & Wagemans, 2016; Newell & Shanks, 2014; Shanks, 2016; Vadillo et al., 2016) , and specifically of Hassin's (2013) proposed "Yes It Can" principle . Given this, we suggest that there is currently no strong reason to believe that syntactic and combinatorial semantic processing can occur without awareness. The data that we have collected and reviewed are either not consistent with combinatorial processing, or they can be equally well explained by "classical" theories of consciousness (Baars, 1997 (Baars, , 2005 , in which complex tasks such as sentence processing do in fact require awareness, due to their requirements for global processing and sustained access to working memory. Still, hypotheses such as the "Yes It Can" principle (Hassin, 2013) , as well as other work demonstrating previously unexpected computational power in the unconscious mind (see Dehaene, Charles, King, & Marti, 2014 for review), are interesting, important, and deserving of further test and scrutiny. As such, we wish to end by acknowledging the collegial and friendly interaction we have had with Ran Hassin and his research group (the authors of Sklar et al., 2012) , and their generosity in sharing materials, code scripts and data with us in the process of carrying out this work. Their openness to discussion of our findings, and advice on our methods, have been consistent with the highest scientific standards (even if we remain in disagreement about the conclusions). In the long run, it will be the cumulative evidence collected by the community as a whole, rather than any individual set of results, that will yield a consensus on the boundary conditions for unconscious processing.
